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When Did I Begin? 
Another Critical Response to Norman Ford 
Dr. Paul Flaman 
The author is an Assistant Professor at St. Joseph's College. the 
University of Alberta. Although not a priest. he received his Doctorate in 
Theology (s. T. D.)from the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas in 
1985. magna cum laude. 
In a recent book, When Did I Begin? Contraception of the Human 
Individual in History. Philosophy and Science (Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), Norman Ford argues that an individual human person does 
not begin at fertilization but some fourteen days later with the appearance 
of the primitive streak. He attempts to relate philosophical concepts such as 
"ontological individual" and "personal identity" to recent embryological 
evidence. In "A Critical Note" Nicholas Tonti-Filippini responds, arguing 
that a new human person begins at fertilization. He makes a number of 
valid points comparing monozygotic twinning to various forms of asexual 
reproduction including cloning. He argues that Ford demands "more of the 
early embryo than he would of an adult human individual.") In a 
subsequent article Ford replies, saying that Tonti-Filippini shows no signs 
of "having grasped the thrust of the central line of my reasoning and he fails 
to mention some of my crucial arguments."2 In this article I wish to respond 
to some of these other "crucial arguments." 
In his book Ford develops his thesis quite extensively. While I think his 
work deserves careful consideration, I think he has misinterpreted some of 
the biological data, especially concerning monozygotic twinning and 
chimera formation . My own conclusion is that a new human person does 
indeed begin with the proper completion of human fertilization. This 
ontological question is very relevant to certain ethical issues such as non-
therapeutic research on and / or the destruction of early human embryos. 
Before offering some criticisms of a number of Ford's arguments and 
explaining my own position, I would like to note that we have more in 
common than what separates us. Of particular significance, Ford's book 
offers some good and clear arguments refuting some other common views 
that a human person only begins to exist later than it does in his view, such 
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as at birth or viability or when the human organism has the developed 
structures and immediate capacity to exercise rational thought. Here, Ford 
employs well such concepts as ontological individual and active 
potentiality. He rightly sees that a personalist understanding of the human 
individual needs to be complemented by a metaphysical understanding. He 
sees the Aristotelian hylomorphic (matter-form) theory whereby the soul is 
the form of the body as a satisfactory way of explaining the fundamental 
psychosomatic and ontological unity of the human individual. I agree with 
Ford when he says that 
Once there is a biologically human organism that, without loss of ontological 
identity, has the potential to develop all that is necessary for eventually exercising 
typically human self-conscious rational acts , there is a true human individual [a 
person in the traditional sense).3 
The main focus of this article, however, will be to discuss certain points of 
disagreement with Ford. My hope is that this will make a contribution to 
our search for the truth in this area. 
Some Points of Disagreement Regarding Monozygotic Twinning 
Ford argues that at the first cell division, some hours after fertilization, 
the zygote becomes "two independent cells, two living individuals" and that 
at the second mitotic division there are "four distinct, contiguous, 
genetically identical cells with the zona pellucida. "4 He says each of these 
cells behaves as an individual. Each draws nutrients from its own cytoplasm 
and the surrounding fluids to provide for its energy requirements. Each is 
totipotent, that is, each has the capacity, given the right environment, to 
generate the cell progeny required for the complete individual offspring. 
Soon after this stage totipotency is restricted to groups of cells. Identical 
(monozygotic) twinning in the human can occur naturally anytime from the 
two-cell stage to the stage when the primitive streak forms about fourteen 
days after fertilization. Intercellular communication and cell differentiation 
begin to appear in the human from about the eight-cell stage onwards. 
Concerning the morula stage, he says, "The flexibility of movement and 
allocation of cells as distinct entities argues strongly against the morula 
being a single human individual."5 
I find Ford's interpretation of the biological data here to be faulty on a 
number of grounds. The fact that cells may independently take in nutrients 
from their surroundings and move does not necessarily mean that they are 
distinct ontological individuals rather than parts of one ontological 
individual- one person in this case. If this were true, cells that act in these 
ways after the stage of the appearance of the primitive streak (e.g. the 
migration of cells at various stages of organogenesis or even unattached 
moving cells within body fluids such as the blood within the adult human 
being) should not be regarded as parts of one individual person but as each 
being distinct ontological individuals.6 Such a view would contradict 
another conclusion of Ford with which I agree: 
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Although all the cells in our bodies are genetically identical. each one is not a 
distinct ontological individual. There is only one human individual .. . [that] 
n:ally exists in the primary sense of actual existence. though there are many cells 
which share in the existence of that single living human being. 7 
Thc totipotentiality of cells or groups of cells does not mean that they can 
1wt be parts of one ontological individual, one living organism or one 
human being. Many mature plants have single somatic cells that are 
totipotent. If separated from the plant and placed in appropriate cultures 
they can each give rise to a whole new plant. 8 These totipotent cells were 
certainly integral parts of the plant before being separated . In early human 
embryos cells or certain groups of cells during the first cell-divisions will 
lwt actualize their totipotentiality unless separated (cf. monozygotic twins, 
triplets .. . ) or unless the other totipotent cells or cell groups are destroyed. 
Monozygotic twinning is a rare human phenomenon occurring at 
remarkably constant rates of about 3.5 per 1000 maternities. The reported 
monozygotic triplet rate is below 3 per 100,000 maternities. 9 In the usual 
case. totipotent cells or groups of cells in the early human embryo will only 
actualize a pluripotentiality or multi potentiality For instance, at the 
two-and four-cell stages, although each of the cells is 'totipotent' in the 
sense that each has the potential to give rise to a whole new human being, 
each will usually only give rise to many parts of one human being. 10 As 
long as totipotent cells or groups of cells remain together they constitute 
integral parts of a whole. 11 They do not behave as independent entities 
unless something causes them to separate. In the usual case they remain 
together and they and their cell progeny act in interdependent and 
complementary ways in precise harmony, each contributing many parts to 
the mature organism or adult human being who results, provided 
development proceeds normally. 
Certain cells also have pluripotentiality (although in a more restricted 
sense) at various stages of organogenesis later on in the developmental 
process. Even in the adult human being "stem cells" in the bone marrow are 
pluripotent. 12 These cells which actualize a pluripotentiality are certainly 
parts of one ontolotical individual, living organism or human being. 
Ford seems to assume that there must be some specification or 
differentiation of parts, some commitment of cells or groups of cells in 
certain directions, before an individual human being can exist. 13 Does this 
not reflect a certain erroneous bias, that is, one in favor of specification or 
"s pecialization"? 
Consider a newborn infant before it has been exposed to anyone of the 
many human languages. In an analogous sense the healthy infant at this 
stage has certain "totipotentiality" or "pluripotentiality" with regard to 
language. He or she could learn anyone of the many human languages as 
his or her "mother tongue." When the infant becomes an adult that has 
grown up with one language as his or her "mother tongue", he or she, in a 
real sense, is irreversibly committed this . Although this adult could learn 
other languages, no other language be his or her "mother tongue". 
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One could also consider specialization in a career. A young person that has 
not become highly specialized in one area is usually more versatile with 
regard to career changes than an older person who has been committed to 
one line of work and has been highly specialized for a long time. Concerning 
commitment, one could consider too a person before and after entering an 
indissoluble monogamous marriage (cf. the Catholic understanding of a 
valid sacramental marriage) . Before entering such a marriage a person has a 
certain "multipotentiality". One has the potential to become the spouse of 
anyone of many people, to so commit oneself to anyone of a vast number 
of other persons. Once one has validly entered such a marriage 
(unconditionally committed oneself to only one definite person) one has 
lost this multiple potentiality (at least until one's spouse dies). 
It is a common phenomenon of human development (not only at the 
biological level) that earlier stages have a wider potentiality than later 
stages. In the cases of language, career and marriage, having a wider 
potentiality or being less specialized or committed in one direciton or not 
yet committed to one of many possible directions does not mean that one is 
less of a person or not a person. 
Concerning the human person's right to life, the Vatican's 1974 
Declaration on Procured Abortion. n. 12, states that discrimination based 
on the various stages of human life (or development) is no less inexcusable 
than any other form of discrimination (e.g. racism, sexism). 14 It seems to me 
that discrimination based on being less differentiated (i.e. re one's cells or 
parts having totipotentiality or a greater pluripotentiality) or less 
specialized (re language, career and so on) with respect to whether one is a 
human person or not is incorrect. Being highly specialized (or committed to 
a specific role) in a highly differentiated society can have a certain 
functional value. Also being at a later stage of development and already 
having cells or parts or dispositions that are highly differentiated or 
specialized can enable one to perform certain functions that one could not 
at an earlier stage of development, that is, before the potential to develop 
these was actualized . These, however, do not affect one's status or dignity as 
a human being and fundamental equality with other human beings. 
Concerning Ford's noting that there is no intercellular communication 
between the cells in the early or pre-embryo from the two-cell stage to the 
eight-cell stage, one can note first of all that this is a relatively short time 
(approximately fourteen to thirty hours IS). Secondly, there may be more 
going on between the cells than we have so far detected or that our present 
limited technology is capable of detecting. Scientists working in this area 
acknowledge that there is much that we do not know. Certainly there is 
much more going on than scientists have so far discovered or identified. 16 
Reality is more complex and dynamic than our present state of 
understanding. Thirdly, and perhaps most significant to the argument, at 
certain later stages of development involving the genesis of distinct tissues in 
the living organism (note these follow the stage of the appearance of the 
primitive streak), some cells do not communicate with neighboring cells for 
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a time. In fact, this seems necessary to the differentiation process. 17 These 
cells within the "embryo proper" (after fourteen days) that do not 
communicate with neighbouring cells for a time would be regarded not as 
different ontological individuals but as parts of the same ontological 
individual (human person), according to Ford's thesis. Cells from the 
two-cell stage human embryo to the stage of the appearance ofthe primitive 
streak should thus also be regarded as parts of one ontological human being 
unless there is evidence that twinning has occurred. If there is evidence that 
twinning has occurred, then the various cells should be regarded as parts of 
two human persons respectively. 
Ford argues that extra-embryonic tissues including the chorion and 
placenta, even though their genetic constitution is identical to the fetus , 
should not be regarded as integral parts of the human individual or 
embryo / fetus proper. He notes that respect and grief have traditionally 
been shown for the stillborn fetus which is sometimes buried, but this is not 
done for the placenta. IS In response to this view Tonti-Filippini says that 
certain other parts of the human body such as deciduous teeth and hair are 
discarded in the same way as the placenta. This does not mean that they 
were never integral parts of the human being in question. 19 
Ford, however, gives a number of arguments on this issue which Tonti-
Filippini does not address. Ford considers the placenta to be an auxiliary 
organ and notes that in the case of monozygotic twins one placenta may 
serve the needs of two fetuses . Here he does not consider the placenta to be a 
constituent part of either fetus. Elsewhere, however, he mentions that 
conjoined twins can share certain tissues and organs, without relating it to 
this issue. As long as the conjoined twins have distinct brains, he would 
regard them as distinct ontological individuals (human persons).20 
How should tissues and organs including "extraembryonic" ones as the 
placenta21 that are shared by monozygotic twins be considered? With 
regard to conjoined twins, it seems to me that a part that one twin can 
voluntarily control but not the other (e.g. movement of a certain limb) or 
which is linked to its brain (e.g. which twin senses touch or pain in a certain 
part, or which twin's brain is unambiguously involved in regulating a 
certain organ) should unambiguously be considered a part of that twin. 
Parts that are without nerves (e.g. the outer layer of skin, hair) should be 
regarded as being parts of one or the other twin, since it makes sense to see 
only one principle of unity or substantial form as unifying any given matter 
at a given time. For the most part this may not be too difficult to discern due 
to the location of the part or its connection or unity with clearly identifiable 
parts of one of the twins (e .g. hair on its head or surface skin on its arm or 
the part is receiving blood from the same blood vessels as other parts of the 
twin). Concerning some parts, cells or tissues though, where exactly to draw 
the line may not always be easy or possible for us (e.g. of skin or a blood 
vessel that links the two). 
I think one should consider "shared" parts of the placenta or chorion or 
amnion, also in the case of non-conjoined monozygotic twins, in a similar 
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way. A part clearly linked to one twin (e.g. by umbilical cord and blood 
vessels) should be regarded as a part of that twin. Certain parts of the 
placenta and so on, however, may be difficult or impossible for us to ascribe 
definitely to one or the other twin. This does not mean that they are not in 
reality a part of one or the other, anymore than other "shared" parts (tissues 
or organs) of conjoined twins. 
Concerning this issue it can also be noted that the delineation of "embryo 
proper" and "extraembryonic" tissue is not as simple as Ford presents once 
the stage of the appearance of the primitive streak has arrived. For example, 
during the fourth week following fertilization, as the embryo folds, part of 
the "extraembryonic" material (part of the yolk sack) is incorporated into 
the embryo as the foregut and midgut. 22 In light of this and my conclusion 
(one held by many scientists and medical personne(23) that the placenta and 
so on are integral parts of the living system with the embryo / fetus and 
should be regarded as parts of the human being in question, there is no 
difficulty in seeing the human zygote and pre-embryo as an individual 
human being (or two human beings if there is already evidence that 
twinning has occurred). I agree with Ford that "A human individual could 
not be present before it is actually formed ."24 He thinks that this could not 
be the case if it has not yet been determined which cells' progeny will give 
rise to the embryo and fetus proper and which cells' progeny will give rise to 
extraembryonic tissues. Even if this is so, if the "extraembryonic" tissues 
(placenta ... ) are parts of the human being in question, then the zygote 
should be regarded as a human being and its cell progeny, whether they give 
rise to the embryo and fetus proper or to "extraembryonic" tissues, should 
be regarded as parts of a human being. 
Some Points of Disagreement Regarding Chimera Formation 
Ford speaks of experiments with mice and how 
... single cells taken from three separate early mouse embryos can be aggregated to 
form a single viable chimeric mouse with characteristics of all three parent 
embryos ... the resultant chimeric mouse certainly did not begin at the zygote 
stage. This suggests that in the normal situation, genetically similar cell progeny 
[spelling corrected] of a zygote subsequently form the definitive individual body, 
be it that of a mouse or a human individual.25 
It seems to me that, in some ways, grafting (and even organ 
transplantation) is similar to chimera formation. Perhaps chimera 
formation can be seen as a very early form of grafting. In neither chimera 
formation nor in grafting (nor in organ transplantation) does the 
transplanted cell (or cells) and its progeny or the transplanted tissue, organ 
or grafted part lose its genetic inheritance. There is no mixing of the genes. 
Certain parts of a chimeric mouse (or even a chimeric sheep-goat 
combination, etc.) carry the genes from one set of parents, other parts carry 
the genes from another set of parents and so on. 26 In a graft, the grafted part 
and any parts that develop from it carry the genes of the organism from 
44 Linacre Quarterly 
which it was derived. For example, a fruit producing branch from a cherry 
tree grafted to an apple tree will produce cherries and not apples. 
Transplanted tissue or an organ from one person to another, or even from 
one species to another, still carries the genes and tissues markers of the 
donor. This is why the recipient's body will usually reject the donated organ 
unless mechanisms of rejection are suppressed (e.g. by certain drugs) even 
though the transplanted tissue has become a part of the recipient as an 
ontological individual. 
I think it is proper to see the embryo, the cherry tree and the donor as 
each being ontological individuals before a certain part ofthem is removed 
or disassembled and grafted, transplanted or assembled to another 
ontological individual or part of another ontological individual. The viable 
chimera (also at the early embryo stage), tree with a grafted part, person 
with a transplanted organ, should also be seen as ontological individuals. In 
the usual case of grafting and organ transplantation one can see a continuity 
of the recipient as an ontological individual before and after the graft or 
transplant. This may not always be the case though. For example, in the 
case of a "head transplant" (e.g. the brain of the "recipient" is totally dead 
and the body of the "donor" can no longer support his or her brain), does 
the "donor" or the "recipient" continue as an ontological individual? It 
seems to me that the "donor" would here. Perhaps, in this case, it would be 
better to call this a "body transplant" and say that the identity of the 
"recipient", as in other transplants, continues. 27 
Or consider the partial replacement (transplant or graft) of brain tissue 
(or precursor cells that later produce brain tissue) from one fetus or embryo 
proper to another. 28 If the brain of the recipient as an adult contains some 
parts that carry the genes of one and other parts that carry the genes of the 
other, which ontological individual has continued? If we are unable to know 
with certainty this does not necessarily mean that one of the ontological 
individuals did not continue. Another possibility is that the identities of 
both original fetuses / embryos were destroyed and a new individual began 
to exist at the time of the transplant. I n any case, according to Ford's view, 
the living fetus or embryo proper, whether a subsequent donor or recipient, 
would already be an ontological individual. 
It seems to me that in the case of the chimeric mouse, if as an adult all of 
its brain carried genes derived from one of the early embryos, then that 
ontological individual could be seen as continuing. If, however, the adult's 
brain contained parts which carried genes from more than one early 
embryo, then it may be difficult or impossible for us to know which 
ontological individual continued and which did not. Our not being able to 
tell would not necessarily mean that one of the ontological individuals did 
not continue, anymore than in the case described above involving the 
partial replacement of brain tissue in the fetus or embryo proper. Another 
possibility is that the identity of the original embryos (each an ontological 
individual before being disassembled) was destroyed and the chimera is a 
newly created ontological individuaJ.29 The identity ofthe disassembled 
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living cells before reassembly, it seems to me, might be comparable to the 
identity of a living organ after it has been removed from the donor but 
before it has been transplanted into the recipienpo 
Some Disagreement Related to "Identifiable Body Plan" 
Ford notes that at the stage of the appearance of the primitive streak we 
can distinguish the back from the front (cf. its dorsal and ventral surfaces), 
the top from the bottom (cf. its cranial and caudal ends) , the right from the 
left sides of the body (it now has clearly identifiable bilateral symmetry). He 
seems to assume that we must be able to do this before we have a human 
body, a distinct on-going ontological individual human being. 3l 
Concerning this it should be noted that one can tell the front from the back 
before this stage, with the formation of the inner cell mass and the 
embryonic disc. Also with the formation of the prochordal plate (evident 
slightly before the primitive streak), from which the mouth develops, one 
can discern the top / bottom and left / right of this young human being. If 
identical twins only form at the stage of the appearance of the primitive 
streak (this is very rare), that is, two primitive streaks appear and the 
embryonic disk divides (not completely in the case of conjoined twins), the 
prochordal plate will still be at the top side (cranial end) of both twins and 
the primitive streaks will be at the bottom side (caudal end).32 In such a very 
rare case there may be some mistake on our part (due to our limited 
technology) with respect to identifying left and right sides before the 
appearance of the primitive streaks. 
In any case, if we are unable to identify intrinsic top from bottom, front 
from back, right from left of something, or even if they do not exist, this 
does not mean that this entity is not an ontological individual. Can one 
identify intrinsic top from bottom and so on in a spherical or cube-shaped 
body? In such bodies it is no doubt more accurate to say that intrinsic top 
and bototm and so on do not exist. This does not preclude a spherical body 
and a cube-shaped body from being ontological individuals; indeed they 
are. Ifwe are unable to tell top from bottom and so on, or even if they do not 
yet exist, in the early embryo which is roughly spherical in shape from the 
zygote to the morula stage, this does not preclude these from being various 
stages in the development of a human being. 
Also, at the stages of the appearance of the inner cell mass, the embryonic 
disk, the prochordal plate and the primitive streak, why do these develop in 
particular locations (sides) rather than others? It is not necessary to 
postulate some kind of polarity in the early embryo, before the stage of the 
appearance of the primitive streak, to account for what happens? Nothing 
happens without a cause. Some scientists conclude that the early embryo 
has polarity before the stage of the appearance of the primitive streak. 33 
The Early Human Embryo is Usually Just One Living Organism 
A notable philosophical treatment of the issue "When did I begin?" or the 
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status of the zygote / em bryo / fetus is by J oht1 Gallagher. I t1 it1terpreting the 
biological data he makes use of the prit1ciple of economy or panimot1y. 
According to this principle 
... one should not posit the existence of some further reality to explain 
phenomena when the phenomena can be explained just as well by the realities one 
already knows to exist. To posit the existence of this further reality which is not 
demanded by the phenomena is to go beyond the available evidence, to be fanciful 
rather than realistic. 34 
Beginning with our common experience of persons, Gallagher identifies the 
human person in this workd with a particular living organism of a certain 
kind . Thus a new human person began to exist when this living organism 
(an ontological individual in Ford's sense35) began to exist. Gallagher 
carefully examines a number of hypotheses (with references to various 
authors who hold these) that a human person begins to exist at some point 
later than fertilization. He concludes: " ... there is no real evidence of a new 
human person beginning to exist at any of these points . ... We conclude 
therefore, that the more economical explanation should be held - namely, 
that the embryo is a human person from the time of fertilization.'36 
Since the seventh hypothesis which Gallagher discusses is quite similar to 
Ford's thesis, we will consider it here briefly. Under this hypothesis 
Gallagher discusses both monozygotic twinning and chimera formation . Of 
note in his treatment, Gallagher considers whether the early embryo might 
constitute a colony, a collection of one-celled organisms that act together 
but do not constitute one multicellular organism. Although the early stage 
embryo has one quality in common with colonies, "cells can break away 
from the main body, and develop into a structure similar to the main body" 
(cf. monozygotic twinning), Gallagher concludes that the early embryo is 
not a colony but one organism because 
In one crucial way the early stage embryo is quite different from a colony and 
~uch more like an organism. The cells of the embryo work together in the very 
precise and complex way necessary for the embryo to develop into the fully formed 
baby, who is certainly one organism. The cells of a colony do not work in this way. 
The embryo thus exhibits much more unity than does the colonyY 
Let us now compare Gallagher's and Ford's views more closely. 
According to Ford the human zygote is one ontological individual (one 
organism). He, however, sees the two-cell stage early embryo as two 
ontological individuals (two organisms). From this stage until the latest 
stage when monozygotic twinning can occur (when the primitive streak or 
streaks appear about fourteen days after fertilization) , he argues, 
.. . we do not have a living individual human body, but a mass of pre-programmed 
loosely organized developing cells and heterogeneous tissues until their 'clock' 
mechanisms become synchronized and triggered to harmoniously organize, 
differentiate and grow as heterogeneous parts of a single whole human organism.38 
Is the early human embryo or pre-embryo only one multicellular 
organism (two in the rare case of monozygotic twinning ... ) or a mass of 
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loosely organized unicellular organisms (a colony in the biological sense)? It 
seems to me helpful to consider how biologists, who study the vast diversity 
of living things, define an organism. Eugene 1. Fenster and Ulf Sorhannus 
say, "The organism is a whole; it functions as an integrated unit."39 William 
H. Telfer and Donald Kennedy say, " . . . a multicellular organism, rather 
than being a haphazard structure, is formed with precision." Its rigidly 
limited genetic endowment "leads it to develop to a predetermined shape 
and size, and any significant deviation from that form is generally 
disastrous to the biological success of the individual .. . . "40 Between one-
celled organisms and multicellular organisms William T. Keeton says there 
exist a diversity of colonies with increasing coordination of activity and 
interdependence among cells. At the latter end of this spectrum he considers 
it "largely an arbitrary decision whether one calls Volvox colonial or 
multicellular. "41 
It does not seem to me at all arbitrary, though, to consider the early 
human embryo or pre-embryo as one organism (two in the rare case of 
monozygotic twinning ... ) rather than a colony. In line with the above 
definitions of an organism, the normal early human embryo's cells 
constitute a whole, because they function as an integrated unit. Even 
'totipotent' cells or groups of cells function as parts of a whole unless 
something causes them to separate (cf. the discussion above under 
monozygotic twinning). In rare cases when monozygotic twinning occurs, 
whether separation of 'totipotent' cells or groups of cells occurs at an early 
cleavage stage or of the inner cell mass or the embryonic disk, the cells 
simply begin functioning as respective parts of two wholes. 
The early human embryo or pre-embryo does not develop haphazardly. 
Unless some anomaly occurs, it "is formed with precision". We can say this 
even though there is much about its growth and differentiation that we do 
not understand. Contemporary works on human embryology all outline 
the same stages of normal development (zygote, early cleavage stages, 
morula, blastocyst, development of the inner cell mass, embryonic disk and 
so on). These events occur at regular predictable times.42 In normal 
development differentiation and restriction of the potency of cells occurs at 
appropriate stages and times. If, for example, the restriction of the 
potentiality of cells or groups of cells (also during early cleavage stages) 
occurred too early this could be detrimental to normal development. As an 
organism, the early embryo develops first what it needs to develop first and 
so on. For example, part of the blastocyst, the mural trophoblast, which 
appears to be essential for implantation to occur, already "is apparently in 
its terminal stages of differentiation".43 Movement of cells within the early 
embryo follows a prescribed pattern (contrast cancer cells). To enable this 
tight junction, desmosomes and so on not only form at appropriate times 
and places, but also are disrupted and reform at appropriate times and 
places during early human development. 44 
In light of the above, it seems to me clear that Gallagher'S view that from 
the time of fertilization the early human embryo is one living organism, a 
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human person, is more reasonable than Ford's. If and when monozygotic 
twinning occurs, then from that point on we simply have two living 
organisms, two persons. Ford's postulating that between the zygote stage 
and the stage of the appearance of the primitive streak(s) there is a loosely 
organized mass of cells (a colony in the biological sense) is unnecessary to 
explain the biological phenomena. It is an uneconomical explanation. His 
saying that the 'clock' mechanisms of these cells only "become synchronized 
and triggered to harmoniously organize, differentiate and grow as 
heterogeneous parts of a single whole human organism"45 at the stage of the 
appearance of the primitive streak is contrary to the evidence. It implies that 
the organization, differentiation and so on of these cells prior to this stage 
are not synchronized and harmonious. This is not true. Concerning the 
two-cell stage of the early human embryo, Ford's saying that "Two 
contiguous identical cells do not constitute one living individual"46 is also 
mistaken. First, since one of these cells divides before the other, these cells 
are not completely identical even ifthey are both 'totipotent'.47 Second, this 
statement implies that one ontological individual cannot have similar parts. 
He himself, however, speaks of a new piece of glass as being one ontological 
individua1.48 Does not a new piece of glass have many parts that are quite 
similar except for their respective positions? Even in a living adult human 
person, who is clearly one ontological individual or organism, many bodily 
parts are quite similar to other parts. 
In light of the above, we can, therefore, conclude that the early human 
embryo is usually just one living organism. In the rare case when 
monozygotic twinning occurs we simply have two living organisms. 
The Status of the Human Zygote/Early Embryo 
The Vatican's 1974 Declaration on Procured Abortion states, "From the 
time that the ovum is fertilized, a life is begun which is neither that of the 
father nor of the mother; it is rather the life of a new human being with his 
[her] own growth.(12)49 This Declaration, however, deliberately leaves 
untouched the question of the moment when the spiritual soul is infused 
(see its note 19). The Vatican's Instruction on Respectfor Human Life in its 
Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation also does not answer this 
question. Nevertheless, it teaches that 
... the fruit of human generation, from the first moment of its existence, that is to 
say from the moment the zygote has formed , demands the unconditional respect 
that is morally due to the human being in his [her] bodily and spiritual totality. The 
human being is to be respected and treated as a person from the moment of 
conception; and therefore from that same moment his [her] rights as a person must 
be recognized, among which in the first place is the inviolable right of every 
innocent human being to life. (1.1)'0 
When does God infuse the spiritual soul? My opinion is that this 
normally happens when there is adequate mixing of the materials (including 
the haploid chromosome sets) of the human sperm and ovum, at syngamy, 
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when the process offertilization has been properly completed. 51 This is the 
time when the sperm and ovum become a zygote. A new living organism has 
been formed. This new organism with a new "program" now has a new 
principle of unity (form) which organizes its (his or her) development for the 
rest of its life. It now has the active potentiality to develop towards the 
mature or adult form of human life, even though favorable environmental 
conditions are necessary for this potentiality to be actualized. When the 
sperm first enters the ovum, much of its contents including its nuclear 
contents have not yet mixed with those of the ovum. At this point I would 
regard it as one ontological individual within another (a part from the 
father within a part from the mother) . From this stage to the completion of 
fertilization, the two are in the process of becoming one. 
This time for the infusion of the soul seems to me to be consistent with 
both the biblical view of the unity of the human person, who is identified 
with both one's soul and body or flesh,52 and the Aristotelian / Thomistic 
philosophical view of the unity of matter and form, body and soul. 53 It 
seems logical to hold that once the two have become one flesh, a new living 
organism has begun to exist with a new form or principle which gives it 
unity and teleology and which organizes its growth and development for the 
rest of its life. We now have a new human person in our midst, with both 
body and soul. 
Concerning monozygotic twinning, at whatever stage this happens 
(between the two-cell stage and the stage of the appearance of the primitive 
streak about fourteen days after fertilization), it seems to me that another 
new human person, with a new human soul, would begin to exist whenever 
a new organized whole emerges that already has the form and teleology to 
develop towards another mature adult human being and has in fact begun 
to do SO.54 In reality this may happen a short time before we are capable of 
detecting with our present instruments of technology. This may occur, at 
least sometimes, before complete visible separation of the matter takes 
place (cf. the case of conjoined twins whose bodies are not completely 
separated physically but who are nevertheless two distinct persons}.55 My 
conclusion is that we ought to regard the one-celled zygote as one human 
person and respect him or her as such. If it later becomes evident that there 
is now in fact another organized whole in existence developing towards 
another adult human being (this would also be true of a cloned human 
being), then we ought to regard this as another human person and respect 
him or her as such. 
In closing, since a good part of this article has focused on criticizing some 
of Ford's arguments, I would like to note some ofthe merits of his book. It 
presents a number of various views on the topic clearly and accurately. The 
book's many notes refer to much of the relevant literature in this field 
-biological, philosophical (also some re the Bible and Church teaching) 
and government reports. The book, as noted above (third paragraph), also 
includes some good and clear arguments refuting some other views that a 
human person only begins to exist later than it does in his view (some 
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fourteen days after fertilization) such as at birth or viability or when the 
human organism has the developed structures and immediate capacity to 
exercise rational thought. It is worthwhile noting here, too, that Norman 
Ford, in spite of his personal opinion in this area, explicitly expresses his 
agreement with the Catholic Church's teaching expressed in Humanae 
Vitae and Donum Vitae. 56 He is to be commended for explicitly affirming 
that "the Creator's plan for the responsible transmission of human life as the 
fruit of an act of conjugal love should not be intentionally frustrated", and 
from a moral point of view, given the present state of the discussion, "the 
benefit of any reasonable doubt about the personal status of the early 
human embryo must be resolved by treating the human embryo as a person 
from conception."57 On these points we are in agreement. With respect to 
the ontological question discussed here though, my conclusion, as 
explained above, differs from Ford's. I think that it is reasonable to hold 
that a new human person begins with the proper completion of human 
fertilization. 
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